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 “You do not design a new world order as an emergency measure. 
But you need an emergency to bring about a new world order”. 
Henry Kissinger 
1.  Aim of the network 
Global Matrix proposes to address world governance issues at the systemic level. The 
overarching question is whether the emerging multi-polar constellation is likely to prove 
stable and cooperative, or to reveal an inherent instability. The originality of the project is its 
structured inter-disciplinary (matrix) framework for examining the key dimensions to world 
politics.  
The agenda to be researched is manifestly ambitious, and so the project has set realistic 
objectives, which are: 
•  To establish a robust analytical framework for addressing the major policy issues 
surrounding the future of global governance at the systemic level, and advance the 
state of the art in think tank research in a set of policy domains. 
•  To test how far a group of independent and globally representative think tanks can 
form common views on the major issues, and undertake a constructive `shadowing` of 
the official G20 and other global summitry processes in real time.  
•  To establish a sustainable and semi-institutionalised network of research centres at the 
global level, and thus contribute to the policy-shaping activity of the transnational non-
state sector on global governance issues.  
The overarching substantive questions at the global level are: 
•  With the evident emergence, or re-emergence of multiple major powers in the world, 
what is the systemic and paradigmatic nature of the new constellation that develops?  
•  Does this new constellation merit the description of an order? Where does it lie in the 
spectrum between a new balance-of-power system without global hegemon, versus a 
world order in which international law and multilateral institutions become 
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increasingly important alongside the pervasive influence of non-governmental 
transnational forces and actors?  
•  If a new balance-of-power constellation becomes a dominant characteristic of the 
current tendencies, how should one assess warnings that this ‘system’ may become 
unstable and dangerous for world peace, as in earlier historical episodes? 
•  Or, does this extrapolation of the past ignore the rise of new transnational forces and 
multilateral institutions, themselves the product of globalisation and interdependence, 
which may constrain the major powers to move towards a more normative world 
order? But in this case, what will be the normative foundations of this order, how will 
they be set, particularly as between democratic and non-democratic regimes, and what 
part will non-state actors play in the process?  
To be tractable, the project breaks down these overarching questions about the world system 
into six major ‘sectors’ of policy, and the more precise issues at this level are set out in 
relevant sections below.  
A large body of work exists on multilateralism, much of it reflecting the original meaning of 
multilateral as the opposite of unilateral or bilateral.1 The most developed scholarship on the 
topic probes the utility of multilateral norms or organisations.2 Yet, multilateralism is 
conceived and used in different ways by political actors, often to serve their own narrow 
purposes.3  
The rise of Asia is leading into a rich debate over the future of the international system with 
realist approaches warning over the inherent instability of the transition from a hegemonic 
unipolar/bipolar system4 to a multi-polar/non-polar5/or inter-polar6 world; and whether 
this stands to imperil the multilateral order or contribute to it. Support for a pessimistic view 
is seen in current failures of global governance (e.g. over UN Security Council reform, the 
WTO Doha Round, climate change in the context of the UNFCCC, etc.). Is there an inherent 
inconsistency between multi-polarity and multilateralism? 
As regards the EU, the Lisbon Treaty resolves in principle to raise its level of ambition in the 
field of foreign and security policy to that of a major world actor.7 While the Treaty endorses 
a set of norms, values and principles to frame its external policy, these are not always 
consistent with its practice,8 and they also stand uneasily alongside the different 
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philosophies and power endowments of other actors.9 But the challenge of working out what 
an ‘effective multilateralism’ could comprise has to be the equal responsibility of all global 
actors.  
2.  Methodological and analytical approach 
The approach is multi-disciplinary, drawing in particular on political science, economics and 
international relations. The principal debates in the current literature are indicated in the 
sections that follow. The methodological approach is summarised in the analytical matrix 
(Table 1). In order to be tractable, the world system is broken down into six ‘sectoral’ vectors. 
Analytically each of these vectors relies on well-identified branches of the social sciences: 
thus vectors (1), (5) and (6) rely on political science and international relations, (2) on 
economics, (3) on political science, international relations and sociology, while vector (4) on 
climate change and energy blends economics and political science with crucial evidence from 
the physical sciences.  
Conceptually the work programme will have 3 stages, as detailed below. This is a stylized 
ideal programme that will take some years and significant funding to be achieved. Precise 
selection and sequencing of different modules of work will be decided as a function of 
funding. However it is intended in any case to make an early start to establish the Global 
Matrix brand and operational capacity, if necessary on the basis of low-budget initial phases 
of work, and to secure matching funding in parallel with work in progress.  
Stage 1 consists of outlining the stance of each major power in the six sectoral areas of the 
matrix. The values, aims and interests of these major global actors, as well as their approach 
to key global challenges, will be fleshed out in this context. Short ‘initial conditions’ papers 
will be drawn up for each cell of the matrix. These papers will be compiled by reviewing 
secondary literature and analysing official documents. In addition they will be based on 
semi-structured interviews with stakeholders for the main actors: state officials, politicians, 
journalists, business actors, civil society representatives.  
In the matrix of Table 1, five major actors are identified – China, the EU, India, Russia and 
the US. However there are other participants in the increasingly important G20, which we 
will bring into our work in a more limited and economical fashion, namely Japan and Korea, 
as well Brazil and South Africa from the ‘BRIC’ and ‘BASIC’ groups.  
In addition the matrix includes a ‘transnational’ category, representing a wide range of 
transnational actors including interest and pressure groups: business (multinational 
corporations and business associations), non-governmental organisations (such as human 
rights and environmental lobbies), think tanks, religious movements and the globalised mass 
media. This transnational row in the matrix also has to take account of catastrophic ‘events’ 
that force political leaders to respond under the combined impact of such ‘events’ and 
pressures from non-state actors.10 These elements may be difficult to synthesise in view of 
their heterogeneity and diffuse influence, yet they have to be brought into account to avoid 
overstating the weight of state actors. 
                                                      
9 See the publications of the MERCURY and EU GRASP projects; Laatikainen, K. V. and K. E. Smith 
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York: Palgrave; Pollack, M.A. (2003) ‘Unilateral America, Multilateral Europe?’ in J. Peterson and M. 
A. Pollack (eds) Europe, America, Bush, London, Routledge.  
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Stage 2 confronts these ‘initial conditions’ papers with a set of thematic papers on the dynamic 
driving forces in the world system, screening for instances for harmony or opposition between 
the major actors and transnational driving forces in the given sectoral fields of policy, and for 
cross-cutting synergies or tensions (e.g. impact of climate change on trade policy and 
migration), and potential flashpoints, where tensions could lead to conflict (see section 5.2 
for more detail). 
Stage 3 will use the sets of papers produced in Stages 1 and 2 to explore future systemic 
developments that are seen as a recommended course of action, and assemble ‘world views’ 
by actor and sector. The project coordinators will analyse areas of convergence and 
divergence, and assess how far the emerging multi-polarity might become consistent with a 
workable global multilateral order, or risk dangerous instability.  
2.1  Initial conditions, drivers of change and world impact (Stage 1) 
We now set out a short introductory account of debates and perceptions for each of the 
‘sectoral’ vectors of the matrix, as introduction to Stage 1.  
a.  Political ideologies and regimes  
 
 
Initial conditions. The incremental expansion in the number of democracies witnessed since 
the beginning of the ‘third wave’ has appeared, in the 2000s at least, to pause. A growing 
number of writers have argued that the liberal agenda is on the wane and a more realist 
outlook on the world is required.11 Many academic projects have criticised the recent 
                                                      
11 Gray J, Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia, London: Penguin, 2008; Hyde-Price A, 
European Security in the Twenty-first Century: The Challenge of Multipolarity, London, Routledge, 2007; 
Kagan R, The Return of History and the End of Dreams, London, Atlantic Books, 2008; Saul J. R, The 
Collapse of Globalism and the Reinvention of the World, London, Atlantic Books, 2005; and to a more 
‐  Initial conditions: Democratic and non-democratic regimes have survived the recession; but the 
incremental expansion of global democracy has at least paused 
‐  Drivers of change: Rapid economic development in emerging economies 
‐  World impact: Convergence or not of political regimes as a fundamental factor for the structuring 
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democracy promotion agenda.12 Certainly, an argument has gained currency that ‘state 
capitalism’ and ‘authoritarian capitalism’ offer viable alternatives to liberal-democracy for 
developing countries and will become more prevalent regime types in the reshaped world 
order.13 Many predict that the future will be characterised by a variety of political regime 
types.14 On the other hand, major countries such as Indonesia and Brazil have quietly been 
making impressive progress in consolidating and improving democratic processes. And the 
Arab spring that began in early 2011 belies the argument that some cultures are immune to 
demands for democracy.  
Drivers. A multiplicity of factors have to be brought into account - ideological competition, 
new currents in international politics, shifts in the balance of power among nations, 
structural factors, the disappointing performance of some new democracies in delivering 
societal aspirations. We will research the impact on political regimes of both state-to-state 
relations and transnational dynamics. Crucially this mix of factors combines in different 
ways in different contexts; equally crucial, the factors themselves are dynamic, not static. 
A current issue is what the consequences of the recent global economic crisis appear to be for 
different political regime types. Hard times can be fertile ground for the priority of order 
over individual liberties. However, financial turmoil and/or poor economic prospects have 
also contributed to the downfall of undemocratic regimes in countries ranging from the 
socialist states in Central and Eastern Europe to Indonesia.  
History suggests that there are no iron laws of democratisation, and trends can prove 
strikingly changeable.15 We will investigate such complexity and what the competition in 
political ideologies means for the reshaping of the world order.  
Impact on the world order. The under-determined nature of current political trends opens up 
a rich field of research. While the easy triumphalism of the democracy agenda in the 1990s 
was misplaced, much criticism now risks over-shooting.16 Recent work has begun to suggest 
a more nuanced view of the supposed ‘democracy backlash’.17  
The rise or reinvigoration of several regional powers and emergence of a multi-polar world 
divided along both East-West and North-South lines will mean complex changes that are 
hard to determine. Non-Western international development aid is a growing phenomenon; 
some of this offers the prospect of additional support for democracy, some risks neutralising 
the West’s governance programmes.  
A key debate will be over how different types of political regimes impact the changing world 
order and vice-versa. Will one type of political regime prosper more than others? Will there 
                                                                                                                                                                      
measured extent, Hurrell A, On Global Order: Power, Values and the Constitution of International Society, 
Oxford University Press, 2007 
12 Habermas J, The Divided West, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2006; Duffield M., Development, Security and 
Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2007 
13 Bremmer, I. ‘State Capitalism Comes of Age: The End of the Free Market?’ Foreign Affairs, May/June 
2009 and Gat A., ‘The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2007. 
14 Fine R., Cosmopolitanism, Routledge, 2007; Whitehead L., ‘Losing ‘the Force’? the ‘Dark Side’ of 
democratization after Iraq’, Democratization, 16:2, 215-242, 2009 
15 Keane J., The Life and Death of Democracy, New York, Simon Schuster, 2009, p. 571, p. 586  
16 Garton-Ash T, Free World, London, Penguin, 2004; Halliday F, ‘International Relations in a post-
hegemonic age’, International Affairs, 85/1, 2009, 37-51. 
17 Carothers T., “The Backlash against Democracy Promotion”, Foreign Affairs, March-April, 2006; 
Burnell P and Youngs R. (eds) Democracy’s New Challenges, London, Routledge, 2009 6 |  EMERSON, TOCCI,YOUNGS, CASSARINO, EGENHOFER, GREVI & GROS 
 
be a divergence or convergence of political regime types? Will there be a new robustness of 
autocratic governance, a halting progress of democracy, or the ascendancy of more hybrid 
forms of political regime? 18 
b.  Economics, financial and trade systems  
 
 
Initial conditions. The manifest shift in the centre of gravity of the world economy towards 
rapidly developing countries in Asia and elsewhere is seen in its increasing weight both in 
world output and financial resources. Both China and India now see a return to high growth 
rates, seemingly little damaged by the 2008-09 crisis, and between 1990 and 2020 the 
economic weight of emerging and developing economies may rise from half to double that of 
the advanced economies (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1. The changing weights in the world economy (as a percent of global GDP at PPP) 
 
Note: For the list of the countries included in each group, see IMF Country Groups Information in 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/weodata/weoselagr.aspx. 
Source: World Economic Outlook (IMF) October 2009 and authors’ calculations. 
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On the financial side, the increased holdings of foreign exchange reserves of emerging and 
developing countries have as their counterpart seen dramatic increases in borrowing by the 
US over the last decades,19 leading to mutual dependence between China and the US.20 
Nonetheless, the economic ties between the EU and the US remain the core of the world 
economy, today accounting for about 55% of world GDP. Those ties remain bigger, more 
prosperous, more tightly linked, more aligned in terms of free markets and open societies. 
An open question is whether the US and the EU will use their current position to engage 
rapidly rising economies in new mechanisms of economic governance, or divide their 
energies seeking their own advantage in an emerging new order.  
Much has been made at the level of economic doctrine of the demise of the so-called 
‘Washington consensus’.21 However, this ‘consensus’ view hardly constituted an economic 
ideology. It rather represents a set of policy prescriptions applied mainly by the IMF and the 
World Bank when dealing with countries in crisis facing large fiscal and external deficits and 
distorted financial systems, and over this there is little disagreement. 
The one element of the Washington consensus that is being seriously reviewed concerns the 
regulation of financial markets. It is now generally agreed that there can be ‘too much’ 
financial market liberalisation. The key (so far unresolved) issue for policy-makers on both 
sides of the Atlantic is at what point can a financial sector become too large or too 
unregulated. However this is not yet the main question for most emerging economies.22 
Drivers. The renminbi exchange rate issue is often considered a bilateral US-China issue 
because the renminbi is pegged to the US dollar. However, in reality, this is a global issue, 
with Brazil and India recently voicing their concerns in addition to those of the US and the 
EU. The core of the problem is the size of the Chinese current account surplus. While this has 
shrunk considerably, IMF projections indicate that it will start increasing again. Persistent 
Chinese export-led growth policy will impact on other emerging economies as well as 
advanced economies. For the mature economies the distribution of the ‘burden of 
adjustment’ created by the Chinese surplus depends, among other factors, on the strength of 
the euro against the dollar, which in turn depends on how the current eurozone crisis is 
resolved.23  
                                                      
19 Total holding of the Emerging and Developing economies amount to about USD 4,850 billion (i.e. 
65% of the world holdings) of which 2,400 billion held by China alone (Source IMF, COFER, December 
2010 and The People’s Bank of China). 
20 About 75% of Chinese holdings are invested in dollar-denominated US Treasury securities or 
comparable assets. Among others, see D. Gros,(2009) Global Imbalances and the Accumulation of Risk  in 
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3655  
21 John Williamson, What Should the World Bank Think about the Washington Consensus? Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, July 1999; Moises Naim ed., Fads and Fashion in Economic 
Reforms: Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion? Foreign Policy Magazine, October 1999; 
Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Making Globalisation Work’, Penguin, 2006. 
22 The G-20 has designated itself as the forum for coordination in this area, See “The World Economy 
with the G-20”, Y. Oh (ed.), CEPR-KIEP, 2009 and also www.cepr.org for further references for G-20.  
23 Among others see The Euro at Ten: The Next Global Currency? (2009) Edited by J. Pisani-Ferry and A 
.S. Posen, Peterson Institute for International Economics and Bruegel, Washington DC; The Euro at ten- 
Lessons and Challenges (2009) European Central Bank; Dollar versus Euro? Reserve Currency 
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This links to the issue of representation and voting rights in the international financial 
institutions (IFIs) and in particular to the role of China. The ‘natural’ solution to the 
reordering of the representation of Europe and the emerging economies in the international 
financial institutions is clear: an increase in the weight of China, alongside a unification of 
the euro area with a reduced overall weight.  
Various calls for a new Bretton Woods system remain poorly specified. A practical step 
would be for the IMF and the WTO to take responsibility for determining damaging 
exchange rate misalignments and possible trade policy responses, rather than see these 
issues played out bilaterally between the US Congress and Treasury and China. Limits to the 
size and activities of banks are debated, but essentially as US and EU affairs. The rising 
powers favour an increasing role of the SDR (special drawing rights) as a reserve asset and 
numeraire for trade and finance, but this does not yet acquire strong momentum.  
The crisis has pushed China and its Asian neighbours to look to each other more as economic 
partners.24 While the Doha Round seems more stuck than ever, regional trade blocs and 
bilateral free trade agreements seem to progress and FTAs are proliferating across Asia.25 
Also interest in regional monetary agreements is increasing, as for example the Chiang Mai 
Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM), which aims at improving regional monetary stability.26  
There is one specific ‘sleeping issue’ at present, namely the startling financial 
interdependence that has arisen between China and the US. Many analysts observe that the 
two parties have drifted into a state of mutual entrapment, which can only be unwound by a 
major current account adjustment, but which would come only with a corresponding 
exchange rate adjustment that would inflict great financial losses on China.27 Grounds for 
unease seem to exist, given the unpredictability of both US Congressional actions and 
Chinese policies.  
Chinese and Indian leaders see themselves as heading developing countries, with their 
leaders preoccupied with the internal priority of reducing mass poverty. However, these two 
most populous of nations seem not to share similar basic conceptions of economic 
organisation or governance.  
Impact on the world order. The financial crash and recession of 2008-09 has already led to a 
significant revision of the rules for regulation of financial markets, but this is largely a 
transatlantic affair. The confluence of the economic crisis, the rise of Asia and the diffusion of 
economic power raises more fundamental global systemic questions: Will there be a return to 
the extended supply-chain, easy credit models of globalisation prevalent before the recession 
or the evolution of other patterns of trade and finance? Will new dynamics in monetary and 
trade policy regimes see a shift in the direction of regionalism at the expense of global 
regimes? How will rising powers seek to influence the policies of the IFIs? And will the US 
and the EU seek to reposition themselves while engaging with the rapidly developing 
                                                      
24 See China and the world economy: A European Perspective (2010) Jean Pisani Ferry, Bruegel Policy 
Contribution, March 2010  
25 Bhagwati, Jagdish, Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements Undermine Free Trade, 
Oxford University Press, 2008 
26 Yonghyup Oh, “European Monetary Fund and Asian Monetary Fund”, CEPS Policy Brief, (forthcoming) 
2010 
27 See for instance Obstfeld, M. and K. Rogoff (2005), “Global Current Account Imbalances and 
Exchange Rate Adjustments”, Brookings Papers on Economics 1, 67–123, and The future of China’s 
Exchange rate policy,(2009) M. Golstein and N. R. Lardy, Policy Analyses in International Economics 87, 
Person Institute for international Economics. GLOBAL MATRIX | 9 
 
economies? The Chinese-US financial interdependence is now reaching huge proportions, 
but whether this means stability, or vulnerability to instability, is an open question. The non-
resolution of trade and financial imbalances risks creating negative synergies with tensions 
over climate change commitments.  
c.  Demography and migration  
 
 
Initial conditions. Population projections reveal contrasting demographic trends at the 
global level. There will be continuing demographic expansion in Africa, India and the 
Americas through to 2050. However after 2030, China’s population stabilises, as will that of 
the EU, in both cases with serious ageing, while Russia’s grave demographic decline 
continues. These demographic contrasts will have profound consequences, driving a 
reassessment of migration policies. Together with policies aimed at selectively facilitating the 
entry of foreigners and controlling borders, major powers face the need to address the 
movement people (legal and unauthorised) through bilateral and multilateral talks on 
migration and border management.  
Table 2. World population projections (millions) 
  2010  2030  2050 
Africa 1.033  1.524  1.998 
Asia 4.166  4.916  5.231 
 of which China  1.354  1.462  1.417 
 of which India  1.214  1.484  1.613 
United States  317  369  403 
Latin America  588  689  729 
EU 27   498  518  515 
Russia 140  128  116 
World 6.908  8.308  9.149 
Source: UN, population data base, medium variant projections for 2050; except for EU 27: N. van 
Nimwegen and R. van der Erf, Demography Monitor 2008 – demographic trends, socio-economic impacts 
and policy implications in the EU, KNAW Press, 2010. 
In recent decades, the migration agenda has highlighted the need for enhanced cooperation28 
and regular inter-state consultations on the mobility of people aimed at creating state-led 
mechanisms designed to influence migration flows.29 This international agenda has gained 
momentum through state-led consultations in various regions, in which China, the EU and 
its member states, India, Russia and the US have played prominent roles, each with its own 
                                                      
28 Martin, Ph., Martin, S., and Weil, P. (2006), Managing Migration: The promise of cooperation, Oxford: 
Lexington Books. 
29 IOM (2004) International Agenda for Migration Management: Common Understandings and Effective 
Practices for a Planned, Balanced, and Comprehensive Approach to the Management of Migration, Berne: 
International Organization for Migration. Available online HTTP: 
http://apmrn.anu.edu.au/publications/IOM%20Berne.doc. 
-  Initial conditions: Continuing demographic expansion in America, Africa and much of Asia, 
demographic decline-to-stabilisation in Europe; growing international mobility of labour 
-  Drivers of change: Role of private and transnational actors in shaping the evolution of bilateral 
and multilateral global management of international migration; flows of skilled vs. unskilled 
labour; capacity of receiving countries to integrate migrants 
-  World impact: Uncertain developments of major powers’ regulatory capacity  10 |  EMERSON, TOCCI,YOUNGS, CASSARINO, EGENHOFER, GREVI & GROS 
 
aims and priorities. Such consultations, known as ‘regional consultative processes’ (RCPs)30 
have opened regular channels of communication among countries of destination, of transit 
and of origin. At the same time, RCPs have contributed to defining common orientations and 
understandings on how the movement of persons (migrants and citizens) should be 
monitored.31 However, RCPs have implied much more than the capacity to influence 
migration. They also develop guiding principles which become normative values shaping 
how the movement of people should be regulated and understood. It is questionable, 
however, how far these quite soft processes will stand up to possible catastrophic waves of 
migration, driven by extreme poverty and environmental factors. 
Drivers. Researching critically the respective goals, policies and interactions of the major 
powers should thus represent a first step in the enquiry into the drivers of global migration 
policies. However, states are not the only actors in the management of migration. Non-state 
actors play an increasing role in shaping governmental agendas, priorities and practices in 
the management of migration.32 International organisations as well as multinational 
corporations have been mobilised in the design and implementation of migration policy over 
the last decade.33 Most notably in Europe and the US, the outsourcing of migration controls 
to private contractors has gained momentum over the last decade, in principle in order to 
reduce costs, and enhance states’ ability to respond to shocks and uncertainties (e.g. illegal 
border-crossing, mass arrivals of aliens).34 But this also raises questions to be researched 
whether this outsourcing is imparting policy bias.35 In addition, the nature of migrants – 
skilled vs. unskilled – is becoming an increasingly important question for regions such as 
Europe, which is both shrinking and ageing, and thus increasingly reliant on inflows of 
skilled labour. However at present 85% of unskilled labour from developing countries goes 
to the EU and only 5% to the United States, whereas 55% of skilled labour goes to the US and 
only 5% to the EU.36 
                                                      
30 The first RCP was established in 1985, followed by many others after 1995, often as the result of 
specific events such as the fall of the Soviet Union and security concerns post 9/11 (International 
Orgainsation for Migration (see http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/regional-consultative-processe). 
Major RCPs on migration include the 1991 Budapest Process, the 1996 Puebla Process, the 1996 Inter-
Governmental Asia-Pacific Consultations on Refugees, Displaced Persons and Migrants, the 2000 
Migration Dialogue for West Africa, the 2001 Söderköping Process, the 2001 Berne Initiative, the 2002 
5+5 dialogue on migration in the Mediterranean, etc.  
31 A. Klekowski von Koppenfels (2001), The Role of Regional Consultative Processes in Managing 
International Migration, IOM Migration Research Series No. 3, International Organisation for 
Migration, Geneva. 
32 C. Mitchell (1989), “International Migration, International Relations and Foreign Policy”, 
International Migration Review 23(3), 681-708. 
33 R.W. Cox (2006), “Problems of Power and Knowledge in a Changing World Order”, in R. Stubbs 
and G.R.D. Underhill (eds) Political Economy and the Changing World Order, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 39-50.  
34 Th. Gammeltoft-Hansen (2009), Access to Asylum: International Refugee Law and the Offshoring and 
Outsourcing of Migration Control, Aarhus: Aarhus University Press. 
35 M. Flynn and C. Cannon (2009), The Privatization of Immigration Detention: Towards a Global View, 
Global Detention Project Working Paper, Geneva: The Graduate Institute; M. Collyer (2008), 
“Migrants, Migration and the Security Paradigm: Constraints and Opportunities”, in F. Volpi (ed.), 
Transnational Islam and Regional Security: Cooperation and Diversity between Europe and North Africa, 
London: Routledge, pp. 119-134. 
36 OECD; Joseph Chamie, "Fewer Babies Pose Difficult Challenges for Europe," 10 October 2007 
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In Russia, China and India, the demographic/migration concerns have very different 
profiles. Russia is confronted by a dilemma: the economic need for immigration to 
compensate for demographic decline, but the limited societal absorptive capacity for 
immigrants for Central Asia, and concern over the prospect of Chinese migration into the de-
populating Russian Far East. China seems now to reconsider its one-child policy in the face 
of a stagnating and ageing demographic prospects, while having to manage its huge internal 
rural-urban migration process. India seems set to overtake China as the most populous 
nation by 2050. Both China and India seem to manage important circular migration patterns, 
with return migrants bringing valuable economic skills for the modern economy.  
Impact on the world order. The questions to be tackled involve several quite distinct themes: 
responses to domestic demographic developments, which may blend 
incentives/disincentives for child bearing with the migration variable; the need to anticipate 
responses to possible catastrophic migratory pressures; the search for compatible economic 
‘human capital’ objectives given the competition for high-quality skills among advanced 
economies and the interests of developing countries in circular migration; and the policy 
implications of the security-industry’s contribution to the technologies of border 
management.  
d.  Climate change and energy  
 
 
Initial conditions. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 
Kyoto Protocol framework could be regarded as classic examples of an international regime 
in the making.37 However this regime has weakened over the course of negotiations over the 
extension of the Kyoto Protocol beyond its first commitment period, 2008-2012, as witnessed 
in Copenhagen in December 2009. In particular the ‘emerging powers’ (in the ‘BASIC’ group) 
prefer to maintain the distinction between advanced and developing countries, whereas the 
US makes its own commitments conditional on commitments by all major polluters, the 
biggest of which is now China. 
A limited achievement in the Copenhagen Accord was the acknowledgement that the 
increase in global temperature should be kept below 2° C. In addition in Copenhagen there 
was a tentative offer by developed countries to build up financial assistance to developing 
countries to $100 billion p.a. by 2020.38 The Cancun conference in December 2010 at least 
confirmed that the UNFCCC process should continue. 
                                                      
37 S. Krasner, International regimes. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985; Miles, E.L. et al. 2002 
Environmental regime effectiveness : Confronting theory with evidence. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press; 
Oberthür, S. and T. Gehring (eds.), 2006, Institutional interaction in global environmental governance: 
Synergy and conflict among international and EU policies. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
38 See, for example, Paul Baer, Tom Athanasiou, Sivan Kartha and Eric Kemp-Benedict, “The 
Greenhouse Development Rights Framework: The Right to Development in a Climate Constrained 
World”, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Berlin, November 2008. 
-  Initial conditions: Impasse over the post-Kyoto global regime  
-  Drivers of change: Prospects of catastrophic tipping point in climate change, creating surge in 
world public opinion, transnational civil society and driving political actors  
-  World impact: Risks are of existential proportions for all, with major potential for disrupting 
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Closely related to finance is the technology question. Generally, climate-friendly 
technologies are already available39. With some exceptions, companies in the developed 
world own most of these technologies. Developing countries argue that developed countries 
should either agree on technology transfers under regulated concessional terms; or pay the 
incremental cost of such technologies to them.40  
Initially the architects of the Kyoto Protocol envisaged the creation of a global carbon market 
in a top-down manner through country-based emission targets and the allocation of 
corresponding national allowances.41 However the absence of a global cap-and-trade scheme 
has triggered concerns, especially in the EU, over the dislocation of energy-intensive 
industries to emerging economies. The alternative might be a ‘bottom-up’ approach reliant 
on national or regional schemes.42 The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) foresees several 
options to link with other domestic cap-and-trade schemes in this way. 43  
Drivers of change. Given the apparent deadlock of negotiations at the UNFCCC multilateral 
level, what factors could generate a renewed positive momentum? Awareness of the 
potential costs of inadequate policies have certainly advanced in recent years, for example 
the risks of increased drought and desertification in several world regions and flooding from 
the rise in sea levels in coastal regions. Experts predict that millions of people could become 
environmental migrants by 2050, but mostly internally rather than internationally.44 The 
most dramatic scenario is that of the tipping point, in which the processes of global warming 
acquire self-intensifying and irreversible dynamics. As and when such evidence may become 
more visible and tangible, governments may be forced to act. Civil society, going beyond 
‘green’ groups and including conservative and religious groups might reinforce this 
pressure. This could add to officially mandated norms with intensified private sector 
initiatives, or the ‘bottom-up’ processes already mentioned.45  
Impact on world order. For the particular purpose of our project, priority issues to be 
researched will be the cross-sectoral linkages, especially relating to trade and development 
                                                      
39 B. Sandén and C. Aznar, ‘Near-term Technology policies for long-term climate change targets – 
Economy-wide versus technology specific approaches’, Energy Policy 33:1557-1576 (2005); IPCC (2001), 
Contribution of Working Group III to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, Bert Metz, Ogunlade Davidson, Rob Swart and Jiahua Pan (eds), Cambridge University Press.  
40 International partnerships include the Renewable Energy & Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP) 
and the International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation (IPEEC) established by the G8, 
China, India and South Korea (http://www.reeep.org/). 
41  Michael Grubb, Christiaan Vrolijk, and Duncan Brack (1999), The Kyoto Protocol: A Guide and 
Assessment (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs); Oberthür, S and H. E Ott, The Kyoto 
Protocol. International Climate Policy for the 21st Century. Berlin: Springer, 1999. 
42 C. Carraro and C. Egenhofer (eds.) (2007), Climate and trade policy: Bottom-up approaches towards 
global agreement, especially Chapter 1. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
43 European Commission, Towards a comprehensive climate change agreement in Copenhagen, 
COM(2009)39 final, January 2009; Noriko Fujiwara, Flexible mechanisms in support of a New climate 
change regime. CEPS Task Force Report, December 2009.  
44 Zetter 2009 quoted in M. Stal and K. Warner, “The way forward: Researching the environment and 
migration nexus”, Research Brief based on the outcomes of the 2nd expert workshop on climate 
change, environment and migration, Munich, 23-24 July 2009, published by UNU-EHS in October 
2009. 
45 N. Fujiwara and C. Egenhofer, 2010, ‘The role of industry in sectoral approaches’, paper prepared 
for the study on global sectoral approaches as part of a post-2012 framework, supported by the 
European Commission, DG Enterprise and Industry, ACTION ENT/CIP/08/C/No2Soo. GLOBAL MATRIX | 13 
 
policies, yet including also larger questions such as energy security and notably access to 
energy. On the trade policy linkage, it is untenable politically to try to enact cap-and-trade 
systems that impose costs on companies operating in the U.S. or Europe only to have them 
shift jobs and pollution to countries such as China or India, which are reluctant to embrace 
binding emission reductions. Yet potential remedies, such as imposing additional "border 
charges" on carbon-intensive imports and subsidizing domestic producers, could lead to 
retaliation or challenges in the WTO. A comprehensive climate change regime could also 
require new trade rules in intellectual property, services, government procurement, and 
product standards.46 
Rapidly rising economies are relying on extensive use of oil and gas, as well as other 
resources. If China and India were to use as much oil per person as Japan does today, their 
demand alone would exceed global oil demand. These trends are also generating inflationary 
pressures as global demand drives up the price of commodities, and are simply untenable 
for a global economy of 6 billion people. Breaking the link between the production of wealth 
and the consumption of resources is an historic challenge, but also an opportunity to move 
toward entirely different patterns of consumption and competitiveness. The open question is 
whether this can be done both in terms of innovation but also in terms of governance. Yet 
failure to do so will have very costly consequences for future generations. The importance of 
energy sustainability on the international agenda will only grow as the international 
community addresses this long-term challenge. Moreover, other challenges stemming from 
climate change will arise and demand further international cooperation, particularly water 
scarcity, biodiversity, food security, and deforestation. 
e.  Strategic security  
 
 
Initial conditions. The nature of international security has changed dramatically, altering the 
nature of the state and the global challenges faced by major powers. This has opened a set of 
questions regarding how China, the EU, India, Russia and the US act in the international 
arena. This can draw on three strands of IR theory.  
The classical realist response has it that major powers act in order to protect their national 
interests: independence, territorial integrity and security.47 They do so through military 
means as well as through economic instruments and diplomacy, pursued unilaterally, 
through strategic alliances, or just ‘coalitions of the willing’. Liberal institutionalists call upon 
                                                      
46 C. Fred Bergsten and Lori Wallach, “Cooling the Planet Without Chilling Trade,” Washington Post, 
November 13, 2009; C. Fred Bergsten, “A Blueprint for Global Leadership in the 21st Century.” 
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=1323; Alan Ahearn, Jean Pisani-
Ferry, Andre Sapir, and Nicholas Veron, Global Governance: An Agenda for Europe (Brussels: Bruegel, 
2006). 
47 Morgenthau, H. (1954) Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
‐  Initial conditions: Contrasting visions of security and the legitimate causes for intervention in 
third states, impasse over UNSC reform and other new architecture proposals 
‐  Drivers of change: Decline of inter-state conflict and rise of intra-state conflicts, transnational 
threats including terrorist networks and nuclear proliferation, transnational civil society 
encouraging the notion of human security  
‐  World impact: Uncertain evolution of international security regimes and behavior of major 
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states to act in order to create dependable expectations and respond to reciprocal obligations 
in the context of international institutions such as the UN, NATO and treaties such as the 
NPT.48  
The empirical relevance of these two schools can be illustrated by different aspects of nuclear 
weapons diplomacy. Realism is vindicated by the current challenge to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), both by global powers such as India, as well as key states like 
Pakistan, Israel, North Korea and Iran. On the other hand, liberal institutionalism is reflected 
in US President Barak Obama’s commitment in 2009 to global nuclear disarmament.49 As 
first steps, the US and Russia agreed on a follow-on START Treaty in March 2010, followed 
in April by the 47 nation Nuclear Safety Summit which set out of wide-ranging programme 
for enhancing nuclear safety. Globally, the nuclear abolition drumbeat is growing as seen in 
UNSC Resolution No. 1887, which would logically require the US, Russia and the other 
seven possessor states to strive for a Nuclear Weapons Convention.  
The third and newer notion is that states act internationally even when their direct national 
interests are not at stake in order to protect people elsewhere: human security.50 Security has 
shifted from being the exclusive domain of the state to an inclusive realm including 
individuals as well, as encapsulated in the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). R2P turns the 
normative foundation of IR since the 1648 peace of Westphalia on its head, replacing the 
traditional doctrine of “sovereignty as protection” with that of “sovereignty as 
responsibility”.51 Both are valuable as well as dangerous. Sovereignty as protection may fail 
to protect citizens from their own states. Sovereignty as responsibility opens the scope for 
strong states to hide behind the R2P doctrine to pursue realpolitik interests. In conflict and 
peace studies literature the objective is to resolve and transform conflict,52 by addressing the 
human needs of conflict societies53 and eradicating the conditions of ‘structural violence’.54 
International institutions have developed related notions since 1990s, including that of 
conflict prevention and peacebuilding.55  
Drivers. The end of the Cold war has seen a questioning of the role of the state in relation to 
international security and society. Whereas democratic developments legitimized opposition 
movements to mobilize and oust authoritarian regimes, the related notion of self-
determination unleashed ethno-nationalism and secessionism. Hence the picture has become 
one of fewer inter-state conflicts but more intra-state ethno-political conflicts. At the 
transnational level, globalization is mounting further challenges to the state, under the 
influences of deepening trade and investment driven by multinational corporations, 
                                                      
48 Hurrell, A. (1992) ‘Collective Security and international order revisited’, International Relations, Vol. 
11, No. 1.; Bercovitch, J. (ed.) (1991) Resolving International Conflicts. The Theory and Practice of Mediation, 
Boulder, Co 
49 Remarks by President Obama delivered in Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009.  
50 Thakur, R. (2006) The UN, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect, 
Cambridge: CUP.  
51 Evans, G. and Sahnoun, M. (eds) (2001) The Responsibility to Protect, International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty.  
52 Wallersteen, P. (2002) Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System, London: 
Sage. 
53 Burton, J. (ed.). (1990) Conflict: Human Needs Theory. London: Macmillan. 
54 Galtung, J. (1969) ‘Violence, Peace and Peace Research’.Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 3, pp. 167-92. 
55 See for example the G8’s Miyakazi Initiative for Conflict Prevention in 2000.  GLOBAL MATRIX | 15 
 
movements of people, and transnational civil society, as well as criminal gangs, terrorist 
networks and militias.  
In an increasingly interconnected world, conflicts that once might have remained local 
disputes can have global impact. Unstable and ungoverned regions of the world pose 
dangers for neighbors and a setting for broader problems of terrorism, poverty and despair. 
The technology and knowledge to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction is 
proliferating among some of the most ruthless factions and regimes on earth. The Cold War 
threat of global nuclear war has diminished, but the risk of a nuclear disaster has gone up. 
Scientific advances have enhanced biology’s potential for both beneficence and malevolence 
by state and non-state actors alike.  
Impact on the world order. These trends have led to diverse repercussions. The international 
community has become more sensitive to human conditions worldwide. This has added to 
the weight in favor of humanitarian interventions,56 multilateral institutions protecting 
human security, and universal jurisdiction (e.g. the ICC or International Criminal 
Tribunals).57 M o r e  b r o a d l y ,  t h e  r i s e  o f  c i v i l  society has induced and legitimized 
transformational approaches to conflicts.58 At the same time, transnational developments 
have spurred ‘new wars’,59 where formerly localized conflicts acquire global proportions. 
These trends also mean that, while conventional military means are still heavily relied upon 
(e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq) these are seen to be ill-equipped to deal with conflicts marked by 
rebellions, terrorism and crime. The changing nature of security challenges and responses of 
major actors will shape the evolution of global security affairs. In order to understand such 
impacts this project will select a set of empirical case studies (e.g., the Iranian nuclear 
question, Afghanistan, Iraq, Middle East and Sudan).  
f.  World views and system  
 
 
Initial conditions. The way in which different worldviews will interplay in shaping the new 
world order is a major issue to be addressed in this project. 60 Four issues stand out. The first 
relates to the very nature and structure of the emerging system, whether different actors 
regard it as multi-polar, non-polar or inter-polar, or as a combination of these three and other 
                                                      
56 Weiss, T. G. (1999) Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crisis. Lanham: Rowman 
and Littlefield. 
57 Falk, R. (2009) Achieving Human Rights, London and New York: Routledge. 
58 Davies, J. and Kaufman, E. (eds) (2002) Second Track / Citizens' Diplomacy. Lanham, Md: Rowan and 
Littlefield; Goodhand, J. (2006) Aiding Peace? The Role of NGOs in Armed Conflict. Burton on Dunsmore: 
ITDG Publishing.  
59 Kaldor, M. (1999) New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era. Cambridge: Polity. 
60 See Keohane, R. (1989) International Institutions and State Power. Essays in International Relations 
Theory, Boulder: Westview Press; March, J.C. and Olsen, J.P. (1989) Rediscovering Institutions. The 
Organizational Basis of Politics, New York: The Free Press. 
‐  Initial conditions: Aspirations of old and new world powers; concepts of multilateralism, 
multi-polarity and regionalisation. 
‐  Drivers of change: Shifts in power, heterogeneity of world powers, and role of transnational 
non-state actors.  
‐  World impact: Uncertain impact of different world views on future of world order, including 
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paradigms.61 This is about the distribution of power and influence in the system.62 Mirroring 
the multi-polarity debate is the issue of hegemony in the international system, and the extent 
that the US’s pre-eminence is waning. The main question here is how to foster order and 
stability, and provide global public goods, in a post-hegemonic (or post-American) world.63  
The second question concerns the different approaches to multilateralism.64 Supposedly a 
driving principle and objective for the EU, multilateralism is more regarded as a means to an 
end (the pursuit of national interest) by the US and, arguably, often used as a rhetorical 
argument in the Chinese debate. Is multilateralism regarded as an objective in itself, or 
mainly as a means to a desired end? How do major powers view the relationship between 
multilateralism (rule-based international order) and multipolarity (emerging polycentric 
system)? Are the two mutually exclusive or compatible?  
Third, the approach to regionalism is a critical test of the views of key actors on power and 
governance at large. In a nutshell, is regionalism regarded as a tool to impose power, to 
balance power or to dilute and domesticate power?65 Is it viewed as a forerunner of 
multilateralism or as an impediment to it? How relevant is the European experience of 
regional integration in the eyes of others?  
The balance between legitimacy and effectiveness in international governance frameworks is 
the fourth dimension that needs addressing. One argument is that emerging powers would 
seriously engage in global governance only if given adequate space at the table.66 However, it 
is a matter for debate whether these powers are willing and able to take on greater 
responsibility for the management of common problems.  
Drivers of change. Four key drivers are pointed out in what follows. First, at a basic but 
fundamental level, are power shifts. The world views of emerging powers matter because 
those wielding them are accumulating more power and, with it, confidence.  
Second, the redistribution of material power resources is accompanied by a shift, or perhaps 
a net loss, of soft power at the global level. The US and the EU may have not been using their 
                                                      
61 Waltz, K.N. (1994) ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’, International Security, Vol. 17, 
No. 2, pp. 44-79; Haass, R.N. (2008) ‘The Age of Nonpolarity. What Will Follow US Dominance’, 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 3; Grevi, G. (2009) ‘The Interpolar World: A New Scenario’, Occasional 
Paper No. 79, Paris: Institute for Security Studies of the European Union. 
62 Peral, L. (2009) ‘Global security in a multipolar world’, Chaillot Paper No 118, Paris: Institute for 
Security Studies of the European Union; Khanna, P. (2008) The Second World. How Emerging Powers Are 
Redefining Global Competition in the Twenty-first Century, London: Penguin Books. 
63 Zakaria, F. (2008) The Post-American World, London: Allen Lane; Clarck, I. (2009) ‘Bringing 
Hegemony Back In: The United States and the International Order’, International Affairs Vol. 35, No. 1, 
pp. 23-36. 
64 Ruggie, J.G. (ed.) (1993) Multilateralism Matters – The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, New 
York: Columbia University Press; Bouchard, C. and Peterson, J. (2009) ‘Conceptualising 
Multilateralism’, Mercury Working Paper No. 1.  
65 Buzan B. and Weaver O. (2003) Regionalism and Powers. The Structure of International Security, 
Cambridge: University Press; Telò M. (ed.) (2007) European Union and New Regionalism. Regional Actors 
and Global Governance in a Post-hegemonic Era, Aldershot: Ashgate. 
66 Jones B., Pascual C. and Stedman J. (2009) Power and Responsibility. Building International Order in an 
Era of Transnational Threats, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press; de Vasconcelos A. “ 
‘Multilateralising’ multipolarity” in Grevi G. and de Vasconcelos A. (eds.) (2008) Partnerships for 
Effective Multilateralism. EU Relations with Brazil, China, India and Russia, Chaillot Paper 109, Paris: 
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resources wisely. It follows that alternative worldviews acquire relevance in a more 
competitive global market of ideas.  
Third, the international system is growing more heterogeneous. For the first time in at least 
two centuries, major emerging economies like China, Brazil and India are still poor or very 
poor countries. As such, poverty eradication and domestic socio-economic development 
feature among the driving priorities of these countries, notably regarding climate change and 
energy security.  
Fourth, non-state actors, including trans-national ones, influence the evolution of the 
worldviews of major powers over time, albeit more so in open societies than in non-
democratic regimes. Relevant players include large business, other economic stakeholders, 
civil society organizations, the media and public opinion.  
Impact on the world order. The shifting balance of world views will define, among other 
factors, the scope for cooperation and conflict in the emerging world order. Will world views 
progressively converge, thereby enabling the reform of global governance structures, or 
diverge, possibly leading to competing multilateral forums? Will regional frameworks 
underpin a rule based world order or will they formalise competing spheres of interest? 
Does the co-existence of different worldviews suggest that informal governance frameworks 
will take roots as permanent platforms for regular exchange and consultation? What are the 
implications for traditional, more inclusive institutions such as the UN system and for the 
G20 and other informal groupings?  
2.2  Dynamic Interactions (Stage 2) 
Here the dynamic interactions between major actors and within and between major issue 
areas will be examined. The matrix structure of our project and accompanying roster of 
experts gives us the opportunity to explore these interactions systematically.  
Inter-actor dynamics. Figure 2 is deliberately naively symmetrical, suggesting a set of equal 
sovereign actors who dominate the international system. In fact virtually all the bilateral 
relationships portrayed in the figure are the subject of ‘strategic partnership’ diplomacy, but 
the real nature and strength of these ties has to be assessed. Figure 2 thus serves as point of 
departure for identifying less symmetrical “realities” regarding both bilateral relations 
between actors as well as their interactions within regional and global multilateral 
institutions. 
There are already several cleavages and alliances between the global actors shaping up and 
potentially being reinvigorated under the impact of multipolarity. Prominent already is the 
BRIC group (Brazil, Russia, India, China), which appears to be driven by the goal of 
asserting its new global influence to balance the old G7, but whose unity of purpose remains 
to be tested. Climate change and trade policy negotiations have seen the emergence of the 
BASIC group (=BRIC plus South Africa, minus Russia), which claims a leadership role for 
the developing world. In response the old G7 democracies discuss the case for deepened 
political and economic coordination, with questions regarding their enlargement to a wider 
grouping of democracies. Regional groupings add a further dimension, evident not only in 
neighbourhood policies (e.g. of EU, Russia, India) but also in strategic regional alliances (e.g. 
East Asian cooperation or the Transatlantic community). Most striking of all is the 
emergence of a de facto G2, in which China and the US discuss key issues of global concern 
(exchange rate and climate change), risking  
to put multilateralism on these issues in suspense. The project will tease out current and 
expected future interactions between major actors within different issue areas, identifying 
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climate change process, for which the mechanism of a tipping point is at least a serious 
scientific hypothesis, and a warning not to be dismissive towards such scenarios. On the 
other hand this has to be balanced by the potential for positive developments, including 
rising educational standards, rising effectiveness of transnational civil society activity, 
democratic mobilization of societies etc.  
Dynamic interactions ‘live’. The G20 process is currently the most significant attempt to find 
more adequate methods of global coordination and leadership. Our project will therefore 
pay special attention to monitoring its progress, and this will be compared with the 
perceptions that emerge from the set of ‘initial conditions’ papers to be produced in the first 
stage of work. The G20 monitoring will:  
•  review the de facto constitution of the G20 for membership and leadership,  
•  in advance of major G20 meetings, appraise the agenda and analyse the issues,  
•  assess the results of such meetings.  
2.3  Resolution (Stage 3) 
While it would be premature to anticipate the conclusions of a first period for the project 
which would last about three years, we can nonetheless sketch the kind of outcome we 
would hope for, and how Stage 3 would proceed, with the following components 
contributing to a consolidated report: 
•  Each ‘actor’ team would assemble a final ‘vision for the future’ paper assessing where 
the multi-polar/multilateral system is and should be heading in the different policy 
areas, how institutions and systems should be improved, and how their ‘actor’ could 
contribute to it. This set of ‘visions’ would be subject of an overarching analysis testing 
for their compatibility or otherwise.  
•  The coordinators would further assess the adequacy or inadequacy of existing systems 
of multilateral coordination and institutions and their ongoing development in 
response to current challenges, and of the dangers inherent in their inadequate 
development. 
•  Based on the actors’ visions for the future and this assessment of existing multilateral 
structures, the project coordinators would draw up a final synthesis of cooperative and 
conflicting visions for the future, pointing to where the system of world governance is 
heading, with identification of main driving forces, patterns of alliances, and 
opportunities for (Pareto-optimal) multilateral cooperation between actors and across 
issue areas.  
•  The coordinators would examine with the authors of the ‘vision’ papers how far it 
would be possible to go in terms of commonly agreed recommendations for the 
development of key multilateral institutions and modes of cooperation in the world 
system. These recommendations would concern principal elements in the global order, 
including the main multilateral institutions. Model solutions or reform packages will 
be indentified and tested for their general acceptability to our group. We cannot at this 
stage anticipate the degree of agreement the group could achieve.  
•  Recommendations would, finally, include proposals on how ‘track 2’ work of global 
think tank networks should be continued for the future. 
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Annex. Key participants and their expertise 
 
Institutes 
The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, has a strong expertise in European 
foreign and security policies. Since 2000 it led the “European Security Forum” in partnership 
with the IISS, London, bringing together European, Russian, American and more recently 
Chinese scholars on major topics of global concern.69 In 2008 CEPS published a research 
study relevant to that now proposed70, has been a leading source in Europe of analyses of the 
current economic and financial crisis71, and on the shaping of EU climate change policies.72 It 
has been ranked consistently among the Top 10 world think tanks.73 
The Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome, is Italy’s major research centre in the fields of 
international politics and security. Its main areas of interest are: Italian foreign policy, 
European integration, the Mediterranean and Middle East, transatlantic relations, 
international security and international political economy. IAI has highly‐developed 
networks with research and policy institutes. The Institute disseminates its research results 
through regular printed and electronic publication outlets including its English‐language 
journal (The International Spectator, Routledge). 
The Fundacion par las Relaciones Internationales y el Dialogo Exterior (FRIDE), a think 
tank based in Madrid established in 1999, aims to provide the best and most innovative 
thinking on Europe’s role in the international arena. It strives to break new ground in its core 
research interests of peace and security, human rights, democracy promotion, and 
development and mould debate in governmental and non governmental bodies through 
rigorous analysis, rooted in the values of justice, equality and democracy. Central to FRIDE’s 
work is Europe’s role in the new global environment.  
Johns Hopkins University is one of the premier research universities in the United States. 
The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, located in Washington, DC, is 
one of the leading U.S. graduate schools of international relations, and the only one to have 
campuses in the United States, Europe and Asia. The Center for Transatlantic Relations was 
ranked among the Top 30 Global Think Tanks in 200974 and the Top 20 US Think Tanks in 
2010.  
Fudan University is ranked as one of the top three universities in China. It hosts the School 
of International Relations and Public Affairs and the Fudan Institute of International Studies, 
where more than 60 researchers working in the field of international studies, ranging from 
security, climate change, international political economy, regional studies and China’s 
foreign policy. With its long tradition and global networks, Fudan has the strongest program 
of international studies outside Beijing. 
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70 Nathalie Tocci, ed., “Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and its Global 
Partners”, CEPS, 2008. Several co-authors will be participating in the present project. 
71 Numerous publications by Daniel Gros and Karel Lannoo. 
72 Numerous publications by Christian Egenhofer et al.  
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http://www.fpri.org/research/thinktanks/mcgann.globalgotothinktanks.pdf 
74 University of Pennsylvania, op. cit. 22 |  EMERSON, TOCCI,YOUNGS, CASSARINO, EGENHOFER, GREVI & GROS 
 
Carnegie Moscow Center was established in 1993 as a subdivision of the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, as part of a global research organization, with offices 
also in Beijing, Beirut and Brussels. The Moscow Center covers a broad range of security 
issues, from Russia’s relations with its immediate neighbors to its ties with other regions and 
US-Russian relations. The Center has been ranked No. 1 among 514 think tanks in Russia and 
Eastern Europe75. 
The Delhi Policy Group (DPG) is an independent Indian think tank founded in 1994, which 
seeks to build a non-partisan consensus on issues of critical national interest. It created a 
dialogue on the expanded nature of security in the framework of an inter-disciplinary matrix 
in South Asia. The DPG started a project in January 2007 to examine the emerging Asian 
strategic scenarios, with particular reference to the strategic dynamic between US and Japan, 
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China  
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(world view)   Chen Zhimin, Fudan University 
 
                                                      
75 University of Pennsylvania, op.cit. GLOBAL MATRIX | 23 
 
India  
(political)  Radha Kumar, Delhi Policy Group 
(economic)  Rajiv Kumar, ICRIER, New Delhi 
(demography)  Rupakjyoti Borah, Delhi Policy Group 
(climate)  Surya Sethi, former Permanent Secretary to Govt. Of India 
(security)  Arundhati Ghose, Global India Forum, Kolkatta 
(world view)  Sujit Dutta, Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi 
 
Russia  
(political)  Lilia Shevstova, Carnegie Moscow Center   
(economic)  Sergei Alexashenko, Higher School of Economics, Moscow 
(demography)  Anatoly Vishnevsky, Institute of Economic Forecasting, Moscow  
(migration)  Galina Vitkovskaya , Institute of Economic Forecasting, Moscow  
(climate, energy)  Vadim Konanenko, Stv Anthony’s College, Oxford  
(security)  Oksana Antonenko, IISS, London 
(world view)  Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Center 
  Andrei Makarychev, Nizhni Novgorod University 
  Dimitri Mitin, Nizhni Novgorod University 
 
US 
(political)  Parag Khanna, New America Foundation, Washington 
(economic)  Joseph Quinlan, Center for Transatlantic Relations  
  Daniel Drezner, Tufts University  
(demog./migration) Demitrious  Papademitriou, Migration Policy Institute, Washington  
(climate/energy)  Scott Barret, Columbia University  
(security) Jeremy  Suri,  University of Wisconsin 
(world view)   Daniel Hamilton, John Hopkins University, Washington  
 
Brazil (world view)  Pablo Wrobel, consultant, London 
 
Korea (world view)  Ki-Jung Kim, East-West Institute, Yonsei University, Seoul 
 






Founded in Brussels in 1983, the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is widely recognised as 
the most experienced and authoritative think tank operating in the European Union today. CEPS 
acts as a leading forum for debate on EU affairs, distinguished by its strong in-house research 
capacity, complemented by an extensive network of partner institutes throughout the world. 
Goals 
•  Carry out state-of-the-art policy research leading to innovative solutions to the challenges 
facing Europe today, 
•  Maintain the highest standards of academic excellence and unqualified independence  
•  Act as a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process, and 
•  Provide a regular flow of authoritative publications offering policy analysis and 
recommendations, 
Assets 
•  Multidisciplinary, multinational & multicultural research team of knowledgeable analysts, 
•  Participation in several research networks, comprising other highly reputable research 
institutes from throughout Europe, to complement and consolidate CEPS’ research expertise 
and to extend its outreach,  
•  An extensive membership base of some 132 Corporate Members and 118 Institutional 
Members, which provide expertise and practical experience and act as a sounding board for 
the feasibility of CEPS policy proposals. 
Programme Structure 
In-house Research Programmes 
Economic and Social Welfare Policies 
Financial Institutions and Markets 
Energy and Climate Change 
EU Foreign, Security and Neighbourhood Policy 
Justice and Home Affairs 
Politics and Institutions 
Regulatory Affairs 
Agricultural and Rural Policy 
Independent Research Institutes managed by CEPS 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
Research Networks organised by CEPS 
European Climate Platform (ECP) 
European Network for Better Regulation (ENBR) 
European Network of Economic Policy 
Research Institutes (ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 
 